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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.
i Court of Appeals No. 970258-CA

HEATHER T. CHILDS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 3.
II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the plaintiff have sufficient basis to claim custody

of the minor child, Alex, and whether there was an error on the
part of the court in awarding Alex to the plaintiff.
1*

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call, 767 P. 2d

138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
Whether the finding is clearly erroneous. Ashton v. Ashton, 732
P.2d 147 (Utah 1987).
B.

Was there sufficient evidence to award custody of the

minor children to the plaintiff or should the defendant have been
awarded the minor children.

1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d

138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
Sufficiency of evidence and correction of error.

"Conclusions of

law [are] accord[ed] no particular deference, but [are]
reviewfed] for correctness."

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,

1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc.
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and
Betenseon v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686
(Utah 1982)).
C.

Should the trial court have awarded a greater amount of

alimony to the defendant.
1.

Standard of Review

Abuse of discretion.

Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 978

(Ut.Ct.App. 1988).
D.

The defendant, if the court continues to allow plaintiff

to have custody of the children, allow defendant to have and
provide all day care for and on behalf of the minor children.

00005109.98
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1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d

138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
Sufficiency of evidence and correction of error.

"Conclusions of

law [are] accord[ed] no particular deference, but [are]
review[ed] for correctness."

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068,

1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse. Inc.
v. Service Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and
Betenseon v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales. Inc.. 645 P.2d 684, 686
(Utah 1982)) .
E.

Did the trial court award sufficient attorneys fees to

the defendant.
1.

Standard of Review

Abuse of discretion.

Savage v. Savage. 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah

1988) .
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this
case.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E.
00005109.98
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Medley, presiding wherein after a trial held October 30, 1996
through November 1, 1996, the Court awarded to the plaintiff the
care, custody and control of the defendant's minor child, Alex,
together with the care, custody and control of the parties' minor
children, Patches and Brook.

The trial court awarded alimony to

the defendant, partial attorneys fees, but denied the defendant
the right to provide day care for the minor children.

The trial

court made other orders dealing with debts and property but those
are not at issue in this matter.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Note to reader: P = pleadings, T = trial transcript)
The parties were married on December 14, 1990. (P at p.422)

Prior to the marriage, the defendant had given birth to the child
now known as Alex Childs, which child was born on January 6,
1988. (P at p.423)

The plaintiff is not Alex's biological

father. (P at p.423)

During the marriage the parties had born to

them two children, Patches Childs, born June 12, 1991 and Brooke
Childs, born September 8, 1993. (P at p.423)
The defendant, from the time of the parties' marriage until
approximately December 1994 was the primary care giver to the
minor children. [Pursuant to Finding of Fact number 6 the trial
court found at P-423 that the time period began in December 1993.
This was based upon statements by the plaintiff as to defendant's
00005109.98
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working and being gone at nights which work the plaintiff
correlated to defendants employment at Village Inn. (T-541 at
p.19.)

The date of December 1993 in Finding of Fact number 6 is

clearly in error because the plaintiff's employment at the
Village Inn did not commence until January 1995.
p.136.)]

(T 542 at

The testimony of Kim Peterson, M.S.W., the custody

evaluator, was that the defendant, until January 1995, the
primary care provider to the children.

(T 541 at p.31.)

Prior

to January 1995, plaintiff was spending substantial periods of
time at work and he was not home to be with the children. (T 541
at p.31.)

Prior to January 1995, the defendant was the person

who did the housework, cleaning, shopping, taking the children to
doctors, the laundry, preparation of meals, taking them to their
activities, studying with Alex on his homework. (T 542 at p.157159)

Starting approximately December 1994 to approximately March

1995 when the Complaint was filed in this matter the plaintiff
took a greater role in being with the children, however, the
plaintiff's time at work continued to be a forty (40) hour work
week plus overtime.

Through February 1995 the overtime hours

were 13 hours, 11 1/2 hours, 23 hours each week respectively and
during the month of March 23 hours, 21 1/2 hours, 15 hours, 8 1/2
hours and 10 1/2 hours each week respectively. (T 541 at p.173174.)
00005109.98
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The plaintiff has always provided the financial support for
the family.

The plaintiff earned in 1994 approximately $50,000

(T 541 at p.174).

The defendant earned in 1994 the sum of

approximately $1,300 (T 541 at p.175).

The defendant had only

been minimally employed during the marriage, based on the
plaintiff's requiring that she not be employed. (T 542 at p.142.)
Sometime after the marriage the defendant went to an
attorneys' office in order to determine how plaintiff could adopt
Alex.

The plaintiff never went through any adoption proceedings

but had his name placed upon the child's birth certificate and
gave the child his surname. (T 542 at p.128.)

It is disputed

between the parties as to how or if the placing of the child's
name on the birth certificate would accomplish an adoption.

The

plaintiff states that it was the defendant's idea to put the
surname of "Childs11 on the birth certificate (T 541 at p. 12) and
it was the defendant's position that it was the plaintiff's idea
to put the surname of "Childs" on to the birth certificate rather
than going through the adoption proceedings so that he would not
have to pay attorneys fees for the costs associated with
adoption. (T 542 at p.125-128).

It is undisputed that the only

"father" that Alex has ever known is the plaintiff.
Marital difficulties arose upon defendant's desires to seek
employment and plaintiff always being at work.
00005109.98
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The defendant

became employed as a waitress whereby she would take care of the
children during the day and would work evenings. (T 542 at
p.136).

Because of the marital difficulties between the parties

the defendant eventually did not come home to the marital
residence after her work shift until such time that the plaintiff
would leave to go to work. (T 541 at p.103)

The time period

given by the plaintiff for this course of conduct commenced
December 1994 to the time of the filing of the divorce Complaint
in March 1995. (T 541 at p.103).
The plaintiff obtained custody of the children pursuant to a
Temporary Restraining Order. (P-13-15.)

Since the time of the

Temporary Restraining Order the children have been in the custody
of the plaintiff.

Until the time of the trial the defendant

would have the children during the day until such time that she
went to work with the plaintiff having the children at night.
From the time of the Temporary Restraining Order through and to
the time of the trial defendant would commence work sometime
between 4:00 p.nu to 6:30 p.iru

Up to the time of trial it was

the defendant who got the children to and from school. (T 541 at
p.180).
A custody evaluation was prepared in this matter by Mr. Kim
Peterson, MSW.

Pursuant to the report it was recommended that

the children not be separated. (T 541 at p.42-43.)
00005109.98
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The

evaluation further found that each of the parties were
appropriate parents (T 541 at p.30).

The evaluator determined

that plaintiff was slightly "better" than the defendant based
upon the fact that he was more stable than the defendant.

The

recommendation was for joint legal custody to the parties with
physical custody to plaintiff.

Both parties were deemed to be

fit parents and capable of having custody. (T 541 at p.30)

The

evaluator determined that if Alex was awarded to defendant then
defendant should have all three children because it would be in
their best interests for all three children to be together (T 541
at p.38).

The evaluator determined that the plaintiff would be

required to provide more surrogate care than the defendant (T 541
at p.33-34); both parties were equally likely to stop what they
were doing to help Alex (T 541 at p.41-42); both were concerned
about school performance of the children and from staying away
from negative peers (T 541 at p.42); that the children were as
happy in one home as the other (T 541 at p.42); neither party has
relinquished custody (T 541 at p.43); the children enjoy the
extended families from both parties (T 541 at p.43); the children
are bonded to each party equally (T 541 at p.43); the plaintiff
is more financially capable than the defendant, however, with
child support to the defendant both would be more comparable on
financial problems (T 541 at p.43); there is no preference one
00005109.98
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way or the other for the children to either parent and that they
enjoy each of them equally (T 541 at p.44); the defendant has
been denied access to the children and her family by the
plaintiff and the children desire to be with both sides of the
family (T 541 at p.54); the defendant has never abandoned the
children (T 541 at p.57).

Additionally, the custody evaluator

found that all of the children are bonded to the defendant (T 541
at p.39); the defendant has the willingness to sacrifice her
needs for the needs of the children but there have been times
when both parties have put their needs above the needs of the
children. (T 541 at p.40 and 59)

It was determined by Mr.

Peterson that the defendant was not as focussed on the children
from approximately November or December 1994 to March 1995 with
the plaintiff not being focussed on the children from the time of
the marriage to November or December 1994. (T 541 at p.59)

The

evaluator determined that both parties are now very focussed on
the children and have been since March 1995. (T 541 at p.54)

The

evaluator further found that there were no extra-ordinary
circumstances that exist against the defendant for her not to
have the children with her having no major flaws or personality
problems which would prevent her from having the children. (T 541
at p.40-41)

00005109.98
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The court had found that the defendant had made disparaging
remarks towards the plaintiff in front of the children.

These

remarks are set forth in the Findings of Fact at #22 (P at
p.427) .

The statements that were made were made supposedly to

Kenna Howell by defendant during the month that the defendant had
resided with her right after the court had taken the children
from the defendant and required defendant's removal from the
marital residence pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order. (T
542 at p.3).

The court further found that the defendant had been

having an extra-marital affair which was based upon the testimony
of Kenna Howell (T 542 at p.15) and Chandra Oliver (T 542 at
p.33) though the affair and sexual contact was denied by both the
defendant (T 542 at p. 195) and Allen Michael Morrical, (T 542 at
p.116) the individual with whom the defendant was supposedly
having the affair.
The court found and believed that the defendant was having
an affair with Mr. Morrical and because of such it determined
that her testimony was not worthy of belief. (Finding #22, P at
p.427)
The court determined that the plaintiff had been employed
and was earning approximately $3,300 per month.

The defendant

was employed as a waitress earning $840 gross per month. (P at
p.431)
00005109.98
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The trial court determined that the defendant should be
"estopped" from claiming that the plaintiff is not the adoptive
father of Alex.

The court additionally determined the defendant

to be vindictive towards the plaintiff and that based upon such
that the plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and
control of the parties' two minor daughters and Alex.
The trial court awarded the defendant visitation pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 and the advisory guidelines pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33 but thereafter denied the defendant the
right to provide day care for the children which had been
occurring prior to the time of trial.

(P at p.456 which is

paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce.)
The trial court awarded alimony to the defendant and partial
attorneys fees.
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The defendant should have been awarded the care, custody and
control of all of the parties' minor children together with
custody of her own son.

The defendant was awarded insufficient

alimony and insufficient attorneys fees.

If this court

determines that custody would remain with the plaintiff then the
defendant should be allowed to provide all child care that is
necessary for the minor children.

00005109.98
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VI•

ARGUMENTS
POINT I

CUSTODY OF ALEX CHILDS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE
THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT CUSTODY BE GIVEN TO THE NATURAL
PARENT AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ESTOPPED DEFENDANT
FROM ASSERTING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT ALEX'S FATHER.
A.

THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF
IS NOT THE ADOPTIVE FATHER OF ALEX

The trial court determined that it was in the best interest
of the child, Alex, that custody be awarded to the plaintiff.
However, this determination was in error because plaintiff is not
Alex's parent and under Utah law there is a presumption that
custody should be given to the natural parent.

Hutchinson v.

Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982)(holding that in a custody
dispute between a parent and non parent there is a presumption
custody should be given to the natural parent).

The trial court

had entered an Order that plaintiff is not the natural or
adoptive father of Alex on April 29, 1996. (P at p.191-192)
Because defendant is Alex's natural parent, the parental
presumption should apply and defendant should be given custody of
Alex unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence, which did not occur. (D

P

v. Social

Services and Child W. Dept.. 431 P.2d 547 (Utah 1967))
Alex was born on January 6, 1988.
on December 14, 1990.
00005109.98

The parties were married

Although both parties knew that the
12

plaintiff was not Alex's father, Alex's birth certificate was
amended to show plaintiff as Alex's father.
Defendant argues that plaintiff should not be awarded
custody of Alex because he is not Alex's biological father and he
never adopted Alex.

The trial court, however, determined that

the defendant should be estopped from claiming that plaintiff is
not Alex's father.

The court reasoned that both parties believed

that plaintiff could adopt Alex by amending Alex's birth
certificate.

The court had accepted the plaintiff's statements

that the parties had mutually agreed that the plaintiff would
adopt Alex by placing his name on the birth certificate.

The

defendant's argument was that this was never an adoption and that
all that was taking place was the changing of the surname of the
child whereby he would thereby have the surname of "Childs". It
was not an adoption. (T 542 at p.128)

The parties had the birth

certificate amended and, according to the court, plaintiff relied
upon defendant's advice and encouragement•

The court also found

it meaningful that both of the parties and Alex had represented
plaintiff as Alex's father.
However, the trial court should not have estopped defendant
from asserting that plaintiff is not Alex's father because Utah's
adoption statutes require strict compliance and the plaintiff did
not comply with those statutes in his attempt to adopt Alex.
00005109,98
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Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-30-1 through 78-30-19 prescribe
the several requirements that must be met before one can adopt a
child.

Step-parents wishing to adopt their spouse's child or

children must also comply with these statutes.

Utah's adoption

statutes contain very specific notice and consent requirements.
Utah Code Ann. §§78-30-4.14 & 78-30-4.18. All step-parents
wishing to adopt a spouse's child must file a petition in the
appropriate court.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-7.

It is also

necessary that the adoptive parent or parents and the child being
adopted make an appearance in court.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-8.

The court is required to examine each person before it and
determine if the adoption is in the best interest of the child
before it can grant an order of adoption.
9.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-

The legislature and Utah courts have determined that strict

compliance with these statutes is necessary to protect the best
interest of the child and fulfill the purposes behind the
adoption statutes.
The case In re; Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179
(Ut.Ct.App. 1987) involved the adoption of a child by his stepmother.

The child had lived with his father and step-mother for

over nine years and had no knowledge that his step-mother was not
his natural mother.

The step-mother requested, under the

circumstances, the court to allow the adoption to proceed without
00005109.98
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requiring the child to appear before the court as mandated by
U.C.A. §78-30-8.
Even under the special circumstances presented, the court
determined that the statute should be strictly adhered to and the
child would need to make a court appearance before the adoption
would be granted.

Specifically, the court "conclude[d] that the

appearance requirement of the person adopting the child, the
child adopted, and the consenting parent must be

construed

and is jurisdictionally

Furthermore, "without
nullified."

Id.

required."

compliance,

the adoption

strictly

Id at 1180.
could be

The court's reasoning was that the legislature

wanted the court, and not the adoptive parents, to access whether
adoption was in the best interest of the child. Id.
11

Simply put,

[t]he state is interested in being assured that before a child,

who is an innocent party, shall be adopted its interest and
welfare must be safeguarded, and only after a district judge, set
up by statute to protect the child, has determined that the
child's best interest will be assured, will an order be made."
Id.
In Taylor v. Waddoups. 241 P.2d 157 (Utah 1952) the Utah
Supreme Court nullified an adoption after the natural mother had
given her signed consent and relinquished physical custody of her
child to the adoptive parents. The mother had given her signed
00005109.98
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consent before a notary public but the adoption statutes required
such consent be given before the court. Id. at 158-60.

The court

construed the requirements of the adoption statute strictly and
determined that the consent was not legal because it was not
signed in the presence of the court. Id. at 160. As a result,
the natural mother was entitled to have her child returned to
her.
In the present case, plaintiff did not follow required the
statutory procedures for adopting Alex.

Although plaintiff

stated that he believed that he could adopt Alex by amending the
birth certificate, this is not sufficient to effectuate an
adoption.

It would contravene Utah's clear and long standing

policy that its adoption statues be strictly followed if
plaintiff were able to stand in the same position as a natural
parent although he never took the steps required to legally adopt
Alex.
Furthermore, it is against public policy to estop defendant
from asserting that the plaintiff is not Alex's father.

In Wiese

v. Wiesef 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court decided
against imposing parental support responsibilities upon a stepfather through equitable estoppel.

The court relied on a

previous case, Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649, (Utah 1980) which
determined that to impose support obligations upon step-fathers
00005109.98
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under a theory of equitable estoppel would discourage the
voluntary support of illegitimate children or stepchildren.
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703.
In Wiese, like the present case, a child was born out of
wedlock before the natural mother and step-father were married.
Id. at 701. Also like the present case, the step-father in Wiese
allowed his name to be placed on the child's birth certificate
"to give the child a name" and believe by doing so he could avoid
the costs of a formal adoption procedure. Id. The step-father in
Wiese also developed a father/son relationship with the child and
in all respects treated his step-son as his own.

Id.

Even after

the natural mother and step-father divorced, the step-father
continued his relationship with his step-son. Id.
The natural mother sought child support from the stepfather.

In response, the step-father asserted that he was not

obligated to support the child since he was not the child's
biological father.

The mother argued that the step-father should

be estopped from denying paternity.

The court concluded that the

step-father's conduct was insufficient to establish detriment.
Id.

Therefore, the step-father in Wiese was not obligated under

equitable estoppel to provide child support despite his belief
that he had adopted the child.

If the step-father in Wiese was

not obligated to provide child support, the plaintiff in the
00005109.98
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present case cannot, through equitable estoppel, be given the
full responsibilities of a natural parent. At the very least,
defendant should be able to assert that plaintiff is not Alex's
natural father.
Furthermore, courts have very infrequently used the theory
of equitable adoption.

In most cases, equitable adoption is used

when it is necessary to protect a child's inheritance rights.
For example, in the case In re; Williams' Estate, 348 P.2d 683
(Utah 1960) the Williamses never formally adopted Gladys Williams
but raised her from the time she was three weeks old after they
had entered into a contract with Gladys' biological mother to
adopt.

Several years later and after the Williamses had died,

the administrator of the Williamses estate denied Gladys the
portion she would have been entitled to had she been formally
adopted.

Id. at 684.

The court noted that some allowance "should be made for the
fact that all the parties to such contract are dead, and the
child was an infant when the contract was made." Id. at 685.
Because of the circumstances, the court determined that it would
be an injustice if Gladys were not allowed to prove the existence
of the adoption contract by circumstantial evidence.

Id.

There

are no similar circumstances in the present case that would
warrant invoking equitable adoption.
00005109.98
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In Williams' Estate Gladys

was denied what was rightfully hers after having been raised for
several years by the Williamses.

In the present case, plaintiff

is in the same position as are step-parents . He loves Alex, but
Alex is not his son because plaintiff never formally adopted him.
Also, plaintiff's relationship with Alex does not span several
years as Gladys' relationship did.

It is tragic enough that

plaintiff and defendant's relationship has deteriorated, but it
would be a great injustice if custody were awarded to plaintiff
who is no blood relation to Alex instead of the defendant who
gave birth to Alex before she ever married plaintiff.
Additionally, the legislature modified U.C.A. §30-5-2(1) May
1, 1995 and took out visitation rights to children by others
except to grandparents.

Since only grandparents can have

visitation, why would plaintiff be given greater rights such as
custody?
In sum, the trial court erred in its determination that the
defendant should be estopped from asserting that the plaintiff
was not Alex's father.

The plaintiff had the opportunity to

adopt Alex, but did not. Merely because plaintiff is listed oit
Alex's birth certificate doesn't make plaintiff Alex's father.
The adoption statutes require strict adherence to protect the
best interests of the child and to insure that adoption is
consensual.
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strictly followed so that non-parents are not unknowingly
obligating themselves to support their step-children as their own
without first adopting them.

Furthermore, this is not a case

warranting equitable adoption.

The parties to the supposed

adoption are both still alive and Alex is not being deprived of
any inheritances to which he would otherwise be entitled.

Alex

and plaintiff have a close relationship but this is no different
than the relationship that several step-parents have with their
step-children.

There would be a great injustice if Alex were

denied his natural right to be in the custody of his biological
mother.

As a result, the defendant should have custody of her

son, Alex.
B. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE GIVEN CUSTODY OF ALEX
BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REBUT
THE PRESUMPTION THAT CUSTODY BE AWARDED TO THE
NATURAL PARENT.
The trial court erred in awarding custody of Alex to
plaintiff, because there was insufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption that custody be awarded to the natural parent.

In

Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982) the Utah
Supreme Court stated, fl[i]n a controversy over custody, the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, but
where one party to the controversy is a nonparent, there is a
presumption in favor of the natural parent."
(Utah 1982).
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The law presumes that custody should be awarded to
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the natural parent because "it is rooted in the common experience
of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally share a
strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent
will normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the
child's benefit, and that a natural parent is normally more
sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the
confidence and love of the child than anyone else,"

Id, at 40.

While the parental presumption is not conclusive, "it cannot
be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party
possesses superior qualification, has established a deeper bond
with the child, or is able to provide more desirable
circumstances." Id. at 41. Otherwise, the parent's natural right
to custody of its child would be illusory.

Id.

To rebut the

parental presumption there must be evidence showing all three of
the following factors: first, "no strong mutual bond exists"
between the child and parent, second, "that the parent has not
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest
and welfare for the child's, and [third,] that the parent lacks
the sympathy and understanding of the child that is
characteristic of parents generally." Id.
In the present case, the trial court erred in its
determination that there was enough evidence to rebut the
parental presumption.
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Hutchinson, the court merely determined which person would, in
its view, be a better custodian, it did not first establish that
defendant lacked all three qualities giving rise to the parental
presumption. 649 P.2d 49.

For example, in paragraph 18 of the

Findings of Fact the court found it significant that "[d]efendant
began spending less time at home... working three nights a week,
spending time with friends on other nights and would regularly
return home around 3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m."

In paragraph 19, the

court found it significant that the defendant "spent an
increasing amount of time with a married man."
5 19.

Findings of Fact

The court concluded that, "defendant's moral character is

certainly questionable..."
In contrast, the court determined that the "plaintiff
provided a stable environment for the children in which the
children appear to be thriving."

Findings of Fact f 25.

It also

determined that "plaintiff is involved in the children's lives,
is an appropriate disciplinarian and is supportive of the
children's educational needs and extracurricular activities."
Findings of Fact f 26. The court continued, determining that the
plaintiff had a sound moral character and emotional stability.
Findings of Fact f 28.
These findings do not demonstrate that the defendant lacked
all three characteristics giving rise to the parental
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presumption, rather, they demonstrate, that in the court,s
opinion, the plaintiff is a better custodian of the children than
the defendant.

The court's conclusion is arbitrary and

constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Additionally, the court's

finding is totally contrary to that of the findings of Kim
Peterson, M.S.W., who did the custody evaluation.

Mr. Peterson

spent substantial time periods going through everything about
each of the parties from their homes, lives, collateral
information, back ground information, interviews with the
children, all directly relating to his making a recommendation to
the court.

Mr. Peterson's credentials were never disputed by

either party, each party knowing his credentials were
outstanding.

The trial court attempts to set forth that the

criteria in Hutchinson is rebutted but it gives absolutely no
findings of fact which supports the court's conclusion. Mr.
Peterson sets forth that all the children are bonded to the
defendant; that the defendant has a willingness to sacrifice her
needs for the needs of the children; and further that the
defendant does not lack a sympathy for and understanding of the
children that is characteristic of parents generally. (T 541 at
p. 39-40)
plaintiff.

The criteria in Hutchinson has not been overcome by
Mr. Peterson noted that each parent had certain

periods of time when they were non-responsive to the family
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wherein each had placed their needs above the needs of the
children.

The plaintiff had his needs focussed outside of the

family from the time of the marriage to approximately November or
December of 1994 with his focus on his work, whereas, the
defendant's time period for her not being focussed on the family
was from November or December 1994 to March 1995, a period of at
most of five (5) months compared to four (4) years of the
plaintiff. (T 541 at p.59)

In addition, the court's findings are

"flavored with bias against divorced women, an urban environment,
and women who pursue other than the traditional role of a
homemaker."
1987).

Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Ut.Ct.App.

The defendant's decision to acquire new skills and join

the work force has no bearing on the bond or relationship she has
with her children.

Indeed, the defendant decided to improve her

ability to make a living so that she could contribute to her
children's financial well being as well as her own self worth.
Marchant, 743 P.2d at 203. It is true, that defendant spent more
time away from home because of work.

However, the defendant was

usually gone at times when the children were already asleep.

Her

absence did not interfere with the bond she had with her children
or their needs.

Some of defendant's late nights were due to the

bitter situation at home.

The defendant chose to avoid the

plaintiff so that her children would not be exposed to the
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friction between herself and the plaintiff.

This clearly

demonstrates the willingness of the defendant to sacrifice her
own needs for her children's.
Also, defendant's unsubstantiated affair does not prove that
defendant had no strong bond with her children or that she put
her own needs above those of her children.

The court determined

that the "defendant spent an increasing amount of time with a
married man."

Findings of Fact f 19. The court's finding

demonstrates its bias and moral judgement

against

the

defendant.

It is not surprising that the defendant would seek out a friend
to h^lp her through the difficulties she was experiencing at
home*

The fact that his friend was male does not support the

court's conclusion that defendant had an extramarital affair.
Mar chant,. 743 P. 2d at 204. More importantly however, even if
defendant had an affair, there is no evidence that this affected
the mutual bond between defendant and her children or that the
defendant place her own needs above her children's.
Therefore, the grant of custody of Alex to the plaintiff is

in error because there was not sufficient
parental presumption.

evidence to rebut

the

Because the defendant is Alex's natural

mother, custody cannot be awarded to a non-parent until the
parental presumption is rebutted.

Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 42.

Furthermore, the parental presumption cannot be rebutted by
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evidence showing that the nonparent is merely a better custodian.
Rather, the person challenging the parental presumption must
present evidence showing that the parent has no strong mutual
bond with her children, that she put her needs above the
children's, or that she did not sympathize with or understand her
children.

No such findings were made in this case and custody

should be awarded to defendant, Alex's natural mother.

POINT II
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO AWARD THE MINOR CHILDREN
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND THE CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED
TO THE DEFENDANT.
It is set forth above, that the minor child, Alex, should
never have been awarded to the plaintiff.

It was acknowledged by

both plaintiff and defendant that the children should not be
separated.

The testimony of Mr. Kim Peterson was that the

children should not be separated.
p.421)

(T 541 at p.42-43 and P at

Therefore, the trial court had to make a determination as

to what should be done with the minor children and where they
should be placed.

The trial court did not want to award the

children to the defendant and therefore has attempted to make
findings to support the placement of the children with the
plaintiff.

There are insufficient findings for the placement of

the children with the plaintiff.
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The best evidence as presented at the time of trial is that
the defendant has been vindictive towards the plaintiff and that
she might use her vindictive beliefs against the plaintiff to
prohibit his access to the children.

Also it was stated Mr. Kim

Peterson that the plaintiff is more emotionally stable than the
defendant.

However, in reviewing the criteria pursuant to the

Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903 Mr. Peterson was very
clear that (1) the plaintiff works excessive hours and has
throughout the marriage; (2) the defendant has always been the
primary care provider to the children until January 1995 when the
plaintiff started exercising a greater role in the children's
lives; (3) the plaintiff is more stable while both parents are
clearly fit and capable of having custody of the children; (4)
the plaintiff would be required to provide more surrogate care to
the children than the defendant; (5) neither party has
relinquished custody of the children; (6) both parties enjoy
extended families; (7) the children are bonded equally to both
parents; (8) plaintiff is more financially capable, however, with
child support the defendant could make up that difference; (9)
there is no preference one way or the other of the children to
either parent, that each child loves and enjoys each parent
equally; (10) the defendant has been denied access to her family
and the children desire to be with both sides of the family; (11)
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there are no extra-ordinary circumstance which prohibit the
defendant from having the children. (T 541 at p.40-57)
The testimony of the plaintiff can literally be
characterized as setting forth that he believes that once that
the defendant started working in January 1995 plus she was also
having an affair with deputy sheriff Allen Michael Morrical that
at that point she was no longer a fit and proper parent but prior
to that time that she was a good mother. (T 541 at p.18-19 and
103).

This means she was a good mother for four years but wasn't

for three months.
The plaintiff had informed the court that he had modified
his work schedule so that he could be with the children more.
This is totally contrary to his own testimony and his own records
setting forth that through the months of February 1995 and March
1995 he was working between 8 1/2 to 23 hours per week overtime.
(T 541 at p.173-174).

Plaintiff's history is substantial time at

work with an excess of 420 overtime hours in 1995.
The trial court had to create in some fashion its desire to
award the plaintiff the children.

Without a doubt plaintiff has

the better financial capabilities to take care of the children.
Also, as per Mr. Peterson, he is slightly more emotionally stable
than the defendant.

But because of the fact that the children

need to be kept together and it is the desire of the parties and
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evaluator to have the children kept together the court thereafter
attempts to make findings to say that the defendant should not be
awarded the custody.

The evidence does not support the findings

or conclusions of the court. To the contrary, the evidence
establishes that the defendant has watched the children of the
Morrical's as well as other children in the neighborhood.
Defendant has shown that she is willing to travel extensive miles
each and every day to pick up the children from plaintiff, take
the children to school, pick-up the children up from school and
thereafter take the children back to the plaintiff when she goes
to start work.

The defendants estimated travel is approximately

200 miles per day in order to be with the children since March
1995.

The plaintiff lives in Riverton and the defendant in West

Valley City, all located within Salt Lake County, Utah.

The

evidence shows, in the most favorable light to plaintiff, that
defendant has always been the primary care taker of the children
until approximately December 1994 and that for a four to five
month period she was not focussed on the children.

The

statements as characterized in paragraph #22 of the Findings of
Fact (though denied by defendant) were made when the children had
been taken from defendant pursuant to the Temporary Restraining
Order.

Those statements were at most frustration and anger and
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correlate to defendant's emotional problems as noted by Mr.
Peterson.
No other "offending" statements were offered or presented
after the March 1995 time period.

The statements as allegedly

made by the defendant against the plaintiff as been found at (T
541 at p.132) are specifically denied by the defendant. (T 542 at
p.160.)

Additionally, Kenna Howell sent letters to the court and

Mr. Peterson supporting defendant as the individual to receive
custody of the children. (P at p.39) and as part of custody
evaluation which was published at T 541 at p.22)
The court in Finding #4 of the Conclusions of Law (at Tp.434) states that both the plaintiff and defendant equally love
the children and that the children have a strong equal bond with
the plaintiff and defendant.

The court thereafter concludes

however, that defendant's bond with the children cannot be so
strong because she has had an affair with a married man, "pursued
her own needs to the detriment and sacrifice of the needs of her
own minor children".
conclusion.

The court makes no findings to support this

In fact as noted previously it is contrary to the

evidence as presented by Mr. Kim Peterson.

Mr. Peterson found

that there was no verbal or emotional abuse of the children and
that the only time period of not being focussed on the children
was from approximately November or December 1994 to March 1995.
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There was never any evidence that the children suffered or lost
bonding with the defendant during the four (4) to five (5) month
period.

The children clearly love the plaintiff and defendant

equally.

The children never perceived either parent as giving

them problems, emotional or verbal abuse, or neglect.
custody evaluation and at T 541 at p. 39-42,49).

(See

The evidence

was insufficient to award plaintiff custody of the children.

The

defendant should have been awarded custody of all the children.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARDED INSUFFICIENT ALIMONY
The trial court awarded to the defendant the sum of $350.00
per month alimony for a period of a maximum of two years.

It is

acknowledged that this is a marriage of short duration however,
the standard that the court applied sets forth that the amount of
alimony was based upon not only the duration of the marriage but
defendant's excellent health, youth and ability to prove her
capacity to meet her own needs and her fault in engaging in an
extra-marital affair. (Findings of Fact #34, P at p.432)
Attorneys fees are allowed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35.
Without any doubt the defendant has a need and the plaintiff has
the ability to pay and defendant lacks the ability to provide
sufficient income for herself. [See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1985)].
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earning at most $840 per month and has expenses of $1,250 per
month.

(Findings of Fact #34 at P at p.431).

The plaintiff is

employed and has been earning at least $3,300 per month.

He has

claimed expenses as found by the court total approximately $2,500
per month.

(Finding of Fact #33 at P at p.431)

Throughout the marriage the plaintiff has worked substantial
hours with substantial overtime while the defendant has been
minimally employed.

In 1994 defendant's total income was

approximately $1,300.00.

In 1995 she commenced working as a

waitress earning not even minimum wage. As the defendant
testified at time of trial, her income on a two week period
averaged between $150 and $250 per time period which included her
tips.

(T 543 at p.14)

The plaintiff on the other hand, in 1994

earned approximately $50,000. Plaintiff has always had the joy
of working at a well paying job while the defendant has been
employed at meager jobs.

Defendant lacks education to increase

her status in life with no prospects to improve her status in
life.

It is inappropriate for the court to make a determination

that her alimony should solely be the sum of $350.00 per month
for a period of two (2) years and then take the factors as stated
in paragraph 34 of the Findings of Fact and say that those are
the basis for the limitation.

When the alimony which the

defendant is awarded is taken into consideration with her child
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support obligation together with the amounts that she would have
to pay because of day care and insurance coverage on behalf of
the children there is absolutely no realistic way at present that
she could meet her own needs.
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988)

(Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 978

The alimony that should have been awarded by

the court should have been a minimum of at least $500 per month
together with having the same extended for a period to the length
of the marriage as contemplated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-35.
POINT IV
THE COURT, IP IT ALLOWS THE PLAINTIFF TO HAVE CONTINUED
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, SHOULD ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE
AND PROVIDE ALL DAY CARE FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR
CHILDREN.
The trial court at the time that it published its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereafter received an Objection
to the Decree of Divorce and Request for Clarification. (P at
p.438-44 0)

Pursuant to that request defendant sought to be

allowed to provide all day care on behalf of the minor children.
(P at p.439)

The trial court thereafter denied that request and

entered the Decree of Divorce denying to the defendant the right
to provide the day care on behalf of the minor children.

The

defendant had been allowed to provide the day care pursuant to
the Temporary Restraining Order and had further been awarded that
right purusant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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when the court adopted the provisions as set forth in Utah Code
Ann, §30-3-33 (P at p.434).

(Conclusions of Law paragraph #3 P

at p.434) (Decree of Divorce paragraph #14 P at p.456.)
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33(13) provides as follows:
"Parental
the child
encourage
custodial
care."

care shall be presumed to be better care for
than surrogate care and the court shall
the parties to cooperate in allowing the nonparent, if willing and able, to provide child

The trial court first ordered pursuant to the findings that
§30-3-33 shall be followed and the court thereafter refused and
has prohibited the defendant from providing the child care for
the children.

The custody evaluator stated that the parties

should have joint legal custody and that the defendant should
have the children and care for them in the morning with the
parties to work out ways to share the children.

Mr. Peterson had

further set forth that the defendant needs to be highly involved
in the children's lives.

It was important for not only her to be

involved with the children but for the children to be involved
with her.

(T 541 at p.23-25).

The trial court here, however,

refused to implement the recommendation of the custody evaluator
and has denied the defendant any right to care for the children.
The legislative intent of the statute was for the non-custodial
parent to be able to provide the care for the children and in
this case not only is it important for the children to be highly
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involved with their mother but also because of the economic
circumstances of the defendant it is more appropriate that she
should be able to take care of the children rather than her
incurring the expense of a day care, which she cannot afford.
If this court allows the children to remain in the custody
of plaintiff then the defendant, at the very least, should be
allowed to provide the child care for the children.

Defendant

wants to do this and she is capable of providing the child care.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO AWARD
THE DEFENDANT SUFFICIENT ATTORNEYS FEES.
At the time of the trial the defendant had submitted to the
court Exhibit #6 of her attorneys fees which were in the sum of
$6,819.

The matter was tried for two and one-half (2 1/2) days

before the court together with other extensive work being
performed.

The affidavit as submitted by the attorney for the

defendant and pursuant to Exhibit #6 set forth that the work and
services as performed by the attorney were reasonable, necessary
and well within the community standard for like work and
services.

(Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992)).

The

billing rate was $120.00 per hour which is well within the
community standard for work and services performed in this area
of the law.

Services as performed by the defendant's attorney

were necessitated because of the legal issues which were involved
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in this matter.

There was no objection to the affidavit of

attorneys fees and no cross-examination nor rebuttal to the
attorneys fees.

The defendant, as a waitress, is earning

pursuant to the court's findings $840 per month.

Defendant is

without any means or ability to pay her attorneys fees.

The

award of only $1,000 of attorneys fees to the defendant are
insufficient and inappropriate.
The plaintiff's income being in excess of $3,300 per month
clearly shows that he has the better means and ability to pay the
attorneys fees than the defendant.

The trial court abused its

discretion in awarding only $1,000 in attorneys fees when the
defendant had incurred almost seven times that amount in
attorneys fees.

The trial court found that based upon

defendant's need and plaintiff's ability to pay that plaintiff
was required to contribute $1,000 toward defendant's attorneys
fees. (Findings of Fact #39, T-p.433)

This amount is clearly

insufficient and should be increase by this court.

(Yelderman v.

Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983)).
Additionally, defendant should be awarded her attorneys fees
incurred by her for this appeal.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The court erred when it awarded custody of Alex to the
plaintiff.
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and the parental presumption was never rebutted by the plaintiff.
The factors as set forth in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson were never
rebutted to allow for the plaintiff to prevail to obtain custody
of Alex.

Both parties agree and the custody evaluator agreed

that it is inappropriate to separate the children.

The defendant

is a fit and proper person to be awarded the custody of the
children and that there is only slight differences between the
parties.

It is inappropriate that the plaintiff is awarded

custody of the children rather than the defendant.

This court

should reverse the trial court's award of the children to the
plaintiff and award all of the children to the defendant.
The alimony award as made by the trial court is
insufficient.

The court has limited alimony to two years when

the marriage has been in effect for six years from the time of
marriage to the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

The

defendant has the need, the defendant does not have the resources
to meet her obligations and the plaintiff has the ability to pay.
The amount of alimony should have been increased and should be
for a period of at least the length of the marriage.
The defendant should be allowed, if the court maintains
custody of the children with the plaintiff, to provide the day
care to the children.

There is no rational basis which would or

could be seen to have her precluded from providing the day care.
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The defendant is a good mother, has tended other children in the
neighborhood, has always been the primary care giver to the
children in this matter, and to exclude her as the day care
provider is inappropriate.

This is further compounded by the

financial obligations that would be incurred and the defendant's
inability to pay that financial obligation.

This court should

not validate the trial court's ruling and should therefor allow
the defendant to provide the day care.
The trial court did abuse its discretion in failing to award
to the defendant sufficient attorneys fees.

This court should

increase the attorneys fees awarded to the defendant to the
amount requested at the time of trial to $6,819.00 together with
attorneys fees for this appeal.

;

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

C*^"clay of January, 1998.

RANDY f. LUDLOW
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Third Judicial Etefrict

JAN 3 1 1997
p> SALTjLAK£ COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:

Plaintiff,
VS.

: CASE NO.

954901350

Z

HEATHER T. CHILDSt
Defendant.

:

This matter came on for trial on October 30, 31 and November
1, 1996, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. Plaintiff appeared
in person and through counsel of record, Harry Caston.

Defendant

appeared in person and through her counsel of record, Randy S.
Ludlow.

The Court having

heard

the testimony

from

various

witnesses called by each party, reviewed the pleadings, custody
evaluation and evidence introduced, and being fully advised, hereby
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

and defendant are residents of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three months
prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on December 14, 1990

in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and since that time have been
husband and wife.

CHILDS V. CHILDS

3.

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Irreconcilable differences have arisen which will be

explained in further detail herein which no longer make it possible
for the parties to continue this marriage.
4.

On January 6, 1988, the defendant gave birth to the minor

child known as Alex Childs, plaintiff is not Alex's biological
father.
5.

During the marriage, two children were born, known as

Patches Childs, born June 12, 1991, and Brooke Childs, born
September 8, 1993.
6.

During the marriage and until approximately December

1993, defendant was the primary care giver to the minor children.
In approximately December, 1993 defendant began working three
nights per week, spending time out at night when she was not
working, returning home in the early morning hours. Defendant was
spending less time at home.

During this time plaintiff began

assuming the primary care responsibilities for the children in the
evening.
7.

During

the

marriage,

financial support for Alex.

plaintiff

provided

the

sole

Defendant did not seek child support

from Alex's biological father nor did the biological father provide
financial support, nor seek visitation or contact with Alex in any
way.

Mx^

CHILDS V. CHILDS

8.

PAGE THREE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Since the parties' marriage, plaintiff has been the only

individual who has ever acted as Alex's father.

Plaintiff and

Alex have established a positive, stable, nourishing father/son
relationship with defendant's aid, assistance, encouragement, and
permission.
9.

Immediately after the parties married they agreed that

plaintiff should adopt Alex. Defendant consistently told plaintiff
and other family members that she wanted plaintiff to be on equal
footing with all of the children in light of the mutual love,
respect and honor shared by plaintiff and Alex.
10.

The parties sought legal advice regarding an adoption of

Alex wherein they learned of a one year waiting requirement and
adoption costs.

At this time defendant was pregnant and the

parties had limited financial resources and were concerned about
adoption costs.
11.

Plaintiff and defendant were later advised that plaintiff

could formally adopt Alex by filling in plaintiff's name on Alex's
birth certificate and that this would be an inexpensive method of
accomplishing the adoption.
12.

Defendant encouraged plaintiff to add his name to Alex's

birth certificate to formalize the adoption. Plaintiff relied upon
defendant's advice and encouragement and both parties believed that
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the adoption could be accomplished in this manner.

The parties

completed the necessary paperwork for Alex's birth certificate to
be amended representing plaintiff as Alex's biological father.
13.

The parties believed that plaintiff had adopted Alex.

Throughout the marriage plaintiff, defendant, and Alex represented
to everyone that plaintiff was Alex's father.

Plaintiff relied

upon defendant's actions wherein defendant provided the opportunity
for plaintiff and Alex to establish a father/son relationship.
Plaintiff and Alex would be injured if defendant were allowed now
to assert the parental presumption because plaintiff would not
stand on equal footing with defendant in asserting custody rights
to Alex.
14.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce on March 31, 1995

and requested temporary custody of all of the minor children.
Defendant filed a Motion for Temporary Custody and Child Support
for all minor children without any challenge to Alex's purported
adoption.

and

15.

Defendant participated in the initial custody evaluation

did

not

plaintiff's

communicate
purported

to

the

adoption

evaluator
of

Alex,

any

challenge

consequently,

of
the

evaluation was completed on the premise that plaintiff had lawfully
adopted Alex.
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The custody evaluation was completed on September 26,

1995 and recommended joint custody with plaintiff having primary
physical custody of all minor children.
17.

On October 25, 1995, after receiving the unfavorable

custody evaluation, defendant for the first time filed an Answer
and Counterclaim challenging plaintiff's adoption of Alex and
asserting the natural parent presumption.
18.

In approximately January 1994, defendant began spending

less time at home.

Defendant began working three nights a week,

spending time with friends on other nights and would regularly
return home around 3:00 a.m. to
19.

In

approximately

5:00 a.m.

December

1994, defendant

spent

an

increasing amount of time with a married man, Allen M. Morrical.
Defendant would spend time with Mr. Morrical during the day, either
at her home or at Mr. Morrical's home while plaintiff was at work.
During this time defendant would leave the marital home or work
most evenings to spend time with Mr. Morrical, typically not
returning to the marital home until early in the morning hours.
20.

The

Court

finds that defendant

engaged

in a close

friendship and sexual relationship with a married man, Allen
Morrical, based upon the late, regular evenings spent with Mr.
Morrical and defendant's statements to Chandra Oliver that
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defendant was "seeing Mr. Morrical for over a year." Defendant and
Mr. Morrical shared Mr. Morrical's truck for a year, a cellular
telephone number, a washer and dryer, and Mr. Morrical was a cosigner on defendant's rental application.

Mr. Morrical helped

defendant meet her financial obligations.

Defendant placed her

relationship with Mr. Morrical above and ahead of her parental
duties and responsibilities which had a negative impact on her
minor children.
21.

The

relationship

Court
with

finds

Mr.

that

Morrical

defendant
under

oath

lied
in

about
open

her

court.

Consequently, defendant's credibility as a witness is very poor.
Having lied under oath about a material matter makes her testimony
on other matters not worthy of belief.
22.
children,

The Court finds that defendant regularly degrades the
degrades

the

plaintiff

in

front

resulting in emotional abuse of the children.
defendant's

disparaging

remarks made

of

the

children,

A few examples of

in the presence

children include:
lf

I hope your dad gets in a car crash and dies."

"Brad (plaintiff) doesn't love you."
"I don't know why I had you fucking kids."

of the
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"I'm fucking sick of you kids, I'm sending you to Green
River."
11

1 don't give a fuck where plaintiff is, he is a worthless

piece of shit anyway.11
23.

Defendant is very vindictive, and angry as established by

her regular disparaging remarks of plaintiff in front of their
children.

The testimony of family members, friends, the custody

evaluation, and the defendant's demeanor on the witness stand
further establish defendant's mean, vindictive nature. Defendant's
vindictive nature makes her far less likely to allow plaintiff to
maintain a healthy relationship with the children if defendant was
awarded custody.

In fact, defendant has threatened to take the

children to Mexico if plaintiff is awarded custody.

Based upon

defendant's level of anger, defendant's threat should be taken
seriously.
24.

A custody evaluation was conducted by Kim Peterson. Kim

Peterson concluded that the parties share joint legal custody with
Brad's home designated as the children's primary residence.

Kim

Peterson concluded that Brad is a better choice of being the
custodial parent.

However, this Court finds that based upon

defendant's emotional instability and uncooperativeness, joint
custody would not be in the best interests of the minor children.
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Furthermore, the children have strong bonds with one another and it
is not in their best interests to be separated.
25.

Both prior to and subsequent to the parties' separation,

the plaintiff has provided a stable environment for the children in
which the children appear to be thriving.
26.
is

an

That the plaintiff is involved in the children's lives,
appropriate

disciplinarian

and

is

supportive

of

the

children's educational needs and extracurricular activities.
27.

That the plaintiff has kept the children well-dressed and

groomed and is watchful of the children when they are in his care.
28.

Plaintiff has had custody of all the minor children for

the pendency of this action. The award of temporary custody to the
plaintiff was made after an evidentiary hearing.

During the

pendency of this action the children have done well in plaintiff's
primary care.

Plaintiff has assisted Alex and Patches in their

homework and other school and extracurricular activities.

The

children's best interests are served in continuing the previously
determined

custody

plaintiff's

arrangement

demonstrated

sound

with

plaintiff

in

moral

character

and

light

of

emotional

stability.
29.

The Court finds that defendant's moral character is

certainly questionable based upon her untruthful testimony, her
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chicanery in trying to intentionally provoke plaintiff to hit her
and defendant's conscious choice to place her individual needs and
the

demands

of

her

extramarital

affair

above

her

children.

Furthermore, defendant's regular swearing at the children, the
derogatory remarks about plaintiff in front of the children and
defendant's inability to put the needs of her children above her
own needs demonstrate poor emotional stability.
30.
custody.

The Court finds that both parties proffered a desire for
However,

continual and deep.

plaintiff's

desire

for

custody

has

been

Plaintiff adjusted his work schedule so he

could be available for the children.

Plaintiff treated

his own son without any distinction whatsoever.

Alex as

Plaintiff has

maintained regular employment and is more able to provide the
necessary resources to raise the minor children.

Plaintiff has

demonstrated the ability to place the needs of the minor children
above his own.
31.

The Court finds that plaintiff, with the assistance of

his extended family, can provide quality personal and subrogate
care for the minor children.

While it does appear that defendant

has greater flexibility in her schedule, defendant does work late
afternoon or evening shifts at Village Inn which would interfere
with her ability to provide quality personal care.
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The Court finds that defendant threatened plaintiff and

his family that they will not see the children if plaintiff is
awarded custody.

Based upon defendant's continual harsh demeanor

towards plaintiff and his family, the Court finds that defendant is
not likely to allow plaintiff to maintain frequent and meaningful
contact with the children should she be awarded custody.

In fact,

despite the excellent father/son relationship between plaintiff and
Alex, defendant through argument of counsel, would have the Court
deny visitation rights to plaintiff and Alex. The Court finds that
plaintiff would be more likely to allow defendant to have frequent
visitation with the children.
33.

Plaintiff has been employed throughout the marriage and

is- presently

earning

approximately

$3,300

gross

per

month.

Plaintiff has decreased his work hours in order to meet the
personal needs of the minor children.

Plaintiff has reasonable

monthly expenses in the approximate amount of $2,500 per month.
34.

Defendant

is

employed

approximately $840 gross per month.

as

a

waitress,

earning

Defendant has reasonable

monthly expenses in the approximate amount of $1,250 per month.
Defendant is in need of support from plaintiff and the plaintiff
has the ability to pay the same, therefore, defendant is awarded
alimony on a temporary basis in the sum of $350 per month for a
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period of two years beginning the first of the month after entry of
the Decree.

Temporary

alimony

is appropriate

based

upon

the

duration of the marriage, defendant's excellent health, youth, and
ability to improve her capacity to meet her own needs, and her
fault in engaging in an extra-marital affair.
35.

The defendant should pay plaintiff child support for the

three minor children based upon the gross income of the parties
identified herein pursuant to the uniform guidelines beginning the
1st of the month after entry of the decree unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties.
36.
$125,000.

The marital residence and lot have a current value of
The mortgage balance is $57,000.

The Court cannot find

by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff made a premarital
contribution to the marital residence and lot.
37.

Plaintiff

is awarded

the parties' marital

residence,

subject to defendant's equitable lien in the amount of $34,000,
said equitable lien is payable upon the earliest of the following
occurring:
(a)

The youngest child's graduation from high school,

18th birthday, or emancipation, whichever should occur last.
(b)

Should the plaintiff cohabitate.
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Should the plaintiff sell the home or no longer use

the home for his primary residence.
38.

Defendant

is

awarded

the

identified on page 2 of Exhibit D-4.

personal

property

items

Plaintiff is awarded the

children's furniture, refrigerator, washer, dryer, and all other
personal property in the marital residence, including the trailers.
Defendant is awarded the sum of $1,500 in furtherance of an
equitable division of the marital personal property.
39.

Both parties have incurred reasonable and necessary

attorney's fees.

Based upon defendant's established need and

plaintiff's ability to pay, plaintiff is required to contribute
$1,000 towards defendant's attorney's fees.
40.

There

are

no

pension

or

retirement

plans

to

be

distributed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that jurisdiction is proper and plaintiff

should be granted a divorce from the defendant on grounds of
irreconcilable differences to be final upon entry.
2.

The Court finds defendant should be estopped from raising

the parental presumption.
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The Court finds that even if the parental presumption

were to apply, the presumption is rebutted and it is just and
proper and in the best interests of all the minor children that the
plaintiff be awarded sole legal custody of all the minor children,
subject to defendant's visitation rights which at a minimum shall
be as defined in Section 30-3-35.

The Court also adopts the

advisory guidelines of Section 30-3-33, Utah Code Ann.
4*

All of the children love plaintiff and defendant equally

and deeply.

The children have a strong, equal bond with plaintiff

and defendant. Plaintiff has a strong bond and love for all of the
children.
children.

It is also apparent that defendant loves all of her
However,

this

Court

is

unable

to

conclude

that

defendant's bond to the children is strong, because she chose to
have an affair with a married man and pursue her own needs to the
detriment

and sacrifice of the needs of her minor children.

Defendant's horrendous verbal and emotional abuse of the minor
children clearly establishes that defendant lacks the sympathy for
and

understanding

of

the

needs

characteristic of parents generally.
convincing

that

defendant

of

her

children

that

is

The evidence is clear and

generally

lacks

all

of

characteristics that give rise to the parental presumption.

the
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to

the

tax

dependency

exemption for the minor children.
6.

The plaintiff has available to him through his employment

insurance coverage.

He shall be required to maintain the same on

behalf of the parties' minor children with each of the parties
being responsible for one-half (1/2) of the insurance premium. All
other expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children, which
are not covered by insurance, shall be equally borne by each of the
parties, including all deductibles and co-pays for all medical,
dental, orthodontic, optical and prescription costs.
7.

The defendant should be required to pay one-half of the

plaintiff's work-related day care as is incurred on behalf of the
parties' minor children.

The plaintiff

shall submit

to the

defendant verification of the monies paid out for day care within
ten

(10) days of the receipt of the same and defendant shall

reimburse to the plaintiff one-half of the monies paid to the day
care provider within ten (10) days of receiving verification from
the plaintiff.
8.

Defendant is awarded a Judgment in the total amount of

$2,500 consisting of the attorney fee award in the amount of $1,000
and property distribution in the amount of $1,500.
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That each party pay the debts they have incurred since

their separation.
10•

That plaintiff's counsel prepare a Decree consistent with

the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law*
Dated this

_day of January, 1997.

41A^L

fYROME E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this A I

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law, to

the

day of January, 1997:

Harry Caston
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 E. South" Temple, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney for Defendant
311 S. State/ Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Defendant
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00
Fax: (801) 322-1628
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS,

OBJECTION TO DECREE OP DIVORCE
AND REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 954901350DA

HEATHER T. CHILDS,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant.
THE DEFENDANT, by and through her attorney of record, Randy S.
Ludlow, hereby objects to the Decree of Divorce as filed by the
plaintiff.

The Decree of Divorce was delivered on February 4,

1997, however modification pages were sent over and delivered on
February 6, 1997. The time to object to the same, i.e., the Decree
of Divorce, has not expired.

The plaintiff

has wrongfully

submitted to the court that the time has expired.
1. The first objection to the Decree is that the documents as
submitted by the plaintiff does not award to anyone a decree of
divorce.

It is necessary for the court to enter a decree of

divorce and to state to whom the decree is awarded.

This has not

been done by the plaintiff and therefore the documents as submitted
are not sufficient.
2.

The plaintiff has submitted in paragraph 3 that the

premium for the insurance on plaintiff's coverage attributable to
the children

is the sum of $60.11 per month.

This

is the

clarification that the plaintiff delivered on February 6, 1997.
However, no proof

or documentation

as to the

same was ever

submitted or transmitted to the defendant or defendant's counsel.
3. The plaintiff has wrongfully set forth the amount of child
support in paragraph number 8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-457.14 the defendant falls under the "Low Income Table" and the
appropriate amount of child support pursuant to that table is the
sum of $184.00 per month.
4.

In regards to clarification of this matter; the court has

set forth that the advisory guidelines pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§3 0-3-33 are to take affect.

Pursuant thereto the defendant has

requested telephone contact with the children which has been denied
by the plaintiff and she has further requested to provide the "day
care" for the children.

This day care has further been denied by

the plaintiff. The defendant has the right to provide the day care
/
/
/
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and a plan to allow the same to occur is appropriate in the
circumstances.
SUBMITTED this 13th day of February

RktfD¥^S.^U
AttorneV-fei? Defendant

00004448.97
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO DECREE OF DIVORCE AND REQUEST
FOR CLARIFICATION, by placing the same in the United States Mail,
in a postage pre-paid sealed envelope, this \^y^

day of February,

1997 to the following:
HARRY CASTON
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #600
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133

,
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Christoi(fersq^x
Secretary
//

00004448,97

HHI

ADDENDUM C

I

8 I g T- f^ r f-; D r ^ - T
Byt*5^ i i ^ i ;*•»)& PioSy I

Th

I

* r c J J ^ ' c t e f District

MAR 2 1 1997
~

%

HARRY CASTON (4009)
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MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 East South Temple
600 Gateway Tower East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
(801) 521-4135
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
v.
HEATHER T. CHILDS,

Civil No. 954901350DA

Defendant.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

This matter came on for trial on October 30th, 31st and November 1st, 1996, the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding. The plaintiff appeared in person and through his counsel
of record, Harry Caston. The defendant appeared in person and through her counsel of record,
Randy S. Ludlow. The Court took the matter under advisement and on January 31, 1997 issued
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court having heard the testimony of the
witnesses called by each party, having reviewed the pleadings, the custody evaluation and the
evidence introduced at trial, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does
hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE:

H^Tb

1.

The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the defendant on the grounds

of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to be final upon entry.
2.

The plaintiff is awarded sole legal custody of the minor children, subject to the

defendant's rights which at a minimum shall be defined as §30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated, which
are fully set forth in Attachment "A." The Court also adopts the provisions of §30-3-33, Utah
Code Annotated, also known as the "Advisory Guidelines" that are set forth in Attachment "B."
3.

That the plaintiff is awarded the tax dependency exemption for the minor children.

4.

That for as long as the plaintiff has insurance coverage available to him through

his employment at a reasonable cost, he shall be required to maintain the same on behalf of the
parties' minor children with each of the parties being responsible for one-half of the insurance
premium that is attributable to the minor children. At the time of the Decree, one-half of the
premium that is attributable to the parties' minor children equals $61.84 per month.
5.

All other expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children, which are not

covered by insurance, shall be equally born by each of the parties, including all deductibles and
co-pays for medical, dental, orthodontic, optical and prescription costs.
6.

The defendant shall pay one half of the plaintiffs work-related daycare as is

incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children. The plaintiff shall submit to the defendant
verification of the monies paid out for daycare within ten days of the receipt of the same and the
defendant shall reimburse the plaintiff one-half of the monies paid to the daycare provider within
ten days of her receiving verification from the plaintiff.
2

7.

The defendant is awarded a judgment in the total amount of $2500.00 consisting

of an attorney's fee of $1,000.00 and a property distribution in the amount of $1500.00. Other
than the $1,000.00 contribution that the plaintiff is ordered to make towards the defendant's
attorney's fees, each party shall be solely responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.
8.

Each party is to assume, pay and be solely responsible for any debt they have

incurred since their separation.
9.

That based on the defendant's gross monthly income of $840.00 and utilizing the

low income table, the defendant is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $184.00 per
month, one half of which shall be due on the 5th and one half of which shall be due on the 20th
of each month.
10.

That the defendant is awarded temporary alimony in the amount of $350.00 per

month for a period of two years, beginning the first month after the entry of the Decree of
Divorce. Alimony shall terminate upon the earliest occurrence of one of the following conditions:
a) Two years from the entry of the Decree of Divorce;
b) The defendant's remarriage;
c) Upon establishment by the plaintiff that the defendant is co-habitating with
another person.
11.

That the plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 13727 South Frontier

Street, Riverton, Utah 84065. The plaintiff shall pay, assume and be solely responsible for the
mortgage on the real property. The defendant shall quit claim her interest in the real property to
3

the plaintiff. The defendant shall be awarded an equitable lien against said real property in the
amount of $34,000.00, which shall be payable on the earliest of the following conditions:
a) The youngest child's graduation from high school, eighteenth birthday, or
emancipation, whichever should occur last;
b) Should the plaintiff co-habitate;
c) Should the plaintiff sell the home or no longer use the home as his primary
residence.
12.

The defendant is awarded the personal property items identified on page 2 of

Exhibit nD-4." The plaintiff is awarded the children's furniture, refrigerator, washer, dryer, and
all other personal property in the marital residence including the trailers.
13.

That the defendant's child support obligation shall be subject to automatic income

withholding pursuant to § 62A-11-502 Utah Code Ann. etseq.
14.

That the Court denies the defendant's request made through the Request for

Clarification that she be allowed to provide work-related daycare. The reasons for this denial are
those Findings set forth in the Court's Findings of July 31, 1997 and those Findings and reasons
set forth in the plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Request for Clarification.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

day of March, 1997, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document was hand delivered to the following:
Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney at Law
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By:C^^
lujean\childs\decree .div

5

ADDENDUM D

KIM D. PETERSON, M.S.W.
LICENSED CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER
Addendum

Plaintiff:

Brad & Childs

Defendant:

Heather Childs

Case Number:

954901350 DA

Date: November 12, 1995

I have been informed by Heather and her attorney that Brad never legally adopted Alex
and consequendy has no legal right to obtain custody. If the Court grants Heather
custody of Alex based on the above legal issue, then the other two children should go
with their mother as it is not in the children's best interest to separate them.
Sincerely,
Kim D. Peterson, M.S.W.
Licensed Clinical Social Worker

P O Box 58867

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84158-0867

(801)588-3578 (801)649-3918

